Damasio's Error and Descartes' Truth: An Inquiry Into Consciousness, Metaphysics, and Epistemology

University of Scranton Press (2007)
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Abstract

The question of the relationship between mind and body as posed by Descartes, Spinoza, and others remains a fundamental debate for philosophers. In _Damasio’s Error and Descartes’ Truth_, Andrew Gluck constructs a pluralistic response to the work of neurologist Antonio Damasio. Gluck critiques the neutral monistic assertions found in _Descartes’ Error _and _Looking for Spinoza_ from a philosophical perspective, advocating an adaptive theory—physical monism in the natural sciences, dualism in the social sciences, and neutral monism in aesthetics. Gluck’s work is a significant and refreshing take on a historical debate

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