Reasonable Doubt: A Note on Neutral Illatives and Arguments

Argumentation 13 (3):243-250 (1999)
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Abstract

George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as so, therefore, and hence convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required

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10.1023/a:1007814530099

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G. C. Goddu
University of Richmond

Citations of this work

On Defining ‘Argument’.Jeffrey Goodman - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (4):589-602.

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References found in this work

Propositional Relevance.George Bowles - 1990 - Informal Logic 12 (2).
Favorable Relevance and Arguments.George Bowles - 1989 - Informal Logic 11 (1).
The validation of induction.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):62 – 76.

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