Why we do things together: The social motivation for joint action

Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):588-603 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,937

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Situating Norms and Jointness of Social Interaction.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2013 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 9 (1):225-248.
Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
Joint attention in joint action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
Joint action without and beyond planning.Olle Blomberg - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action.Matti Heinonen - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):168-188.
Just How Joint Is Joint Action in Infancy?Malinda Carpenter - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):380-392.
The epistemic core of weak joint action.Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-04-19

Downloads
107 (#198,819)

6 months
12 (#296,635)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marion Godman
Cambridge University

References found in this work

A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late modern philosophy: essential readings with commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

View all 20 references / Add more references