Abstract

We give an account of the applicability of first order logic to states of affairs. We show that the metaphysics of atomism is incapable of doing this. Against the central thesis of the Tractatus, we show that the logical constant symbols do represent. We rebut Wittgenstein's arguments by showing they are either non sequiturs or beg the question. We provide a model which displays that logically equivalent formulae can and do represent different states of affairs. We also consider criticisms of Hegelians against classical logic and show that, while these criticisms are powerfully effective against atomist ontologies, they are ineffectual against a metaphysic of complexes. We examine Nagel's arguments for logic without metaphysics and turn his arguments into support for the claim that logic itself commits one to ontological claims and presupposes ontological commitments. ;Following the framework developed by Justus Buchler in his Metaphysics of Natural Complexes , we show that atomistic ontologies are incoherent. We show that such ontologies force the logical forms, logical constants and logical necessity out of the extra-mental world by necessarily restricting them to either mentalistic or linguistic or platonist orders. We show how these restrictions make a coherent account of the applicability of logic to the world impossible. ;We provide models and arguments in support of our claims that first order logical forms, constants and necessity are general ontological categories. In addition, we offer a phenomenological verification procedure which can be used by anyone who wishes to understand that logical form, the logical constants and logical necessity, which are located in all orders of complexes, can be found even in contingent events. Thus, we offer a nonplatonist but realist metaphysics of logic