Comment on Breithaupt’s “A Three-Person Model of Empathy”

Emotion Review 4 (1):92-93 (2012)
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Abstract

Breithaupt’s central claim is that “empathy can be regarded as a mechanism for strengthening a decision” . My concern is that it is not clear what is meant by “strengthen.” Does empathy merely give more motivational “oomph” to a decision already made, or does it strengthen a decision in the normative sense—does it give more reason for the decision?

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Peter Goldie
Manchester

References found in this work

Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-14.
A Three-Person Model of Empathy.Fritz Breithaupt - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):84-91.

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