Epistemology and cognition

Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1986)
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Abstract

Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.

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Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
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