Abstract

Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is the subject of this essay. The question is explained, and various answers to it are canvassed, compared and criticized. Chapter 1 develops an understanding of the question in terms of concrete entities and possible worlds. Chapters 2 and 3 present and evaluate answers in terms of a necessary concrete being. Chapter 2 focuses on the ontological argument for a necessary being from Alvin Plantinga, and Chapter 3 focuses on the cosmological argument from Timothy O'Connor. Chapters 4 and 5 present and evaluate answers in terms of there necessarily being something or other concrete. Chapter 4 focuses on an argument for there necessarily being something or other concrete from Jonathan Lowe, and Chapter 5 focuses on the bearing of modal theories from David Armstrong and David Lewis on the answer, and on arguments from Bede Rundle and Henri Bergson. Chapter 6 presents and evaluates the subtraction argument for the possibility of there being nothing concrete formulated by Thomas Baldwin and others. Chapter 7 presents and evaluates an answer in terms of the intrinsic probability of there being something concrete that allows for the possibility of there being nothing concrete, and focuses on an argument from Peter van Inwagen. Chapter 8 summarizes our treatment of the question, states our verdict about each answer, and concludes.