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A bayesian approach in the philosophy of inference [Book Review]
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):161-166 (1984)
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Citations of this work
Why Do Certain States of Affairs Call Out for Explanation? A Critique of Two Horwichian Accounts.Dan Baras - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1405-1419.
From mere coincidences to meaningful discoveries.Thomas L. Griffiths & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2007 - Cognition 103 (2):180-226.
A surprise for Horwich (and some advocates of the fine-tuning argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know))).David Harker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):247-261.
Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.
References found in this work
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle, Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
A Treatise on Probability.J. M. Keynes - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):219-222.
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