Why Being Necessary Really Is Not the Same As Being Not Possibly Not

Acta Analytica 30 (3):267-274 (2015)
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Abstract

In standard modal logic, □ ≡ ∼◊ ∼ and ◊ ≡ ∼□∼. I will, first, examine why in tense-logic, Arthur Prior thinks that ∼ ◊ ∼ is weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ is weaker than ◊. I will, then, examine whether there are similar motivations in modal logic to take ∼ ◊ ∼ to be weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ to be weaker than ◊. The upshot will be that, just as certain metaphysical views within the philosophy of time motivate one to deny the standard tense equivalences, certain metaphysical views within the metaphysics of modality motivate one to deny the standard modal equivalences

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Dana Goswick
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism.Dana Goswick - 2018 - Metaphysics 1 (1):52-62.
Necessity First.Alastair Wilson - 2022 - Argumenta 14.

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References found in this work

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The structure of objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
Time and modality.Arthur N. Prior - 1957 - London: Oxford University Press.

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