Folk theories in the moral domain

In Kurt Gray & Jesse Graham (eds.), Atlas of Moral Psychology. Guilford (2018)
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Abstract

Is morality intuitive or deliberative? The distinction can obscure the role of folk moral theories in moral judgment; judgments may arise 'intuitively' yet result from abstract theoretical and philosophical commitments that participate in 'deliberative' reasoning.

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Tania Lombrozo
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Deference and Ideals of Practical Agency.Jonathan Knutzen - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):17-32.

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