Counterexamples by Possible Conjunction and the Sufficiency of Premises

Teaching Philosophy 26 (1):57-81 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Showing that the premises of an argument are not sufficient for (viz., do not entail) a conclusion a conclusion involves citing a counterexample that would show the premises of the argument to be true and the conclusion false. This paper distinguishes counterexamples by analogy (an argument with the same form as argument against which it is advanced but where it is clearly the case that the premises are true and the conclusion is false), counterexamples by possible conjunction (a conjunction of the premises and the negation of the conclusion), and counter-arguments (arguments directed against the truth of the conclusion). After detailing the logical differences between these concepts, the paper describes the pedagogical significance of this distinction and provides an assortment of test exercises for students.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,937

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-21

Downloads
53 (#409,260)

6 months
10 (#407,001)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Claude Gratton
University of Toronto (PhD)

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references