Is Contrastive Consent Necessary for Secondary Permissibility?

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (3) (2023)
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Abstract

Theron Pummer has argued that contrastive consent is necessary for the phenomenon of "secondary permissibility". I argue that it is not, and I undermine the motivation for thinking that it is.

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