Moral Worth and Moral Belief

Ethics 133 (2):216-230 (2022)
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Abstract

According to some, when you do the right thing, your moral beliefs make no difference to your act’s moral worth. Huckleberry Finn believes he is doing something wrong in helping Jim escape slavery. Yet his act reflects well on him. Some conclude that acting rightly reflects just as well on you whether you believe you are doing something right, wrong, supererogatory, or neutral. I argue against this. Doing the right thing with certain moral beliefs can diminish the moral worth of doing it. In such cases, you do the right thing in the wrong spirit.

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James Grant
Oxford University

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References found in this work

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.
Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident.Jessica Isserow - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):251-264.
Saints, heroes, sages, and villains.Julia Markovits - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):289-311.

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