Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency

Theory and Decision 48 (3):263-286 (2000)
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Abstract

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent

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References found in this work

Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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