Radical enhancement as a moral status de-enhancer

Monash Bioethics Review 1 (2):146-165 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Nicholas Agar, Jeff McMahan and Allen Buchanan have all expressed concerns about enhancing humans far outside the species-typical range. They argue radically enhanced beings will be entitled to greater and more beneficial treatment through an enhanced moral status, or a stronger claim to basic rights. I challenge these claims by first arguing that emerging technologies will likely give the enhanced direct control over their mental states. The lack of control we currently exhibit over our mental lives greatly contributes to our sense of vulnerability. I then argue moral status should be viewed in terms of vulnerability. The enhanced will slowly gain the ability to command their mental states, reducing their vulnerability. These radically enhanced beings will have greater capacities, and possibly an inner life more valuable than our own. They will also be less vulnerable, and as a result, their moral status will be subordinate to our own.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Respect Post-Persons.Ethan Terrill - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies 31 (1):1-14.
Human enhancement and supra-personal moral status.Thomas Douglas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):473-497.
The moral status of post-persons.Michael Hauskeller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):76-77.
We Must Create Beings with Moral Standing Superior to Our Own.Vojin Rakić - 2015 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (1):58-65.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-08-16

Downloads
1,682 (#8,751)

6 months
148 (#30,132)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Saving Elizabeth: Radical Control & the Puzzle of Authenticity.Jesse Gray - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (1):24-26.
A Friendly Critique of Levinasian Machine Ethics.Patrick Gamez - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):118-149.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century.Neil Levy - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence.Andy Clark - 2003 - Oxford University Press. Edited by Alberto Peruzzi.
Superintelligence: paths, dangers, strategies.Nick Bostrom (ed.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Julian Savulescu.

View all 26 references / Add more references