Concept modeling, essential properties, and similarity spaces

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1105-1106 (2001)
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Abstract

Bloom argues that concepts depend on psychological essentialism. He rejects the proposal that concepts are based on perceptual similarity spaces because it cannot account for how we handle new properties and does not fit with our intuitions about essences. I argue that by using a broader notion of similarity space, it is possible to explain these features of concepts.

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Peter Gärdenfors
Lund University

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