Anthropology from a metaphysical point of view

Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1):91-115 (1999)
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Abstract

I argue that there can be, on Kant's account, a significant motivational role for feeling in moral action. I first discuss and reject Andrews Reath's claim that Kant is forced to disallow a motivational role for feeling because of his rejection of moral sense theory. I then consider and reject the more general challenge that allowing a role for the influence of feeling on the faculty of desire undermines Kant's commitment to a morality free from anthropological considerations. I conclude by providing an overview of Kant's discussion of the moral feeling of respect which shows this feeling to meet the criteria he sets for inclusion in moral motivation.

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Jeanine Grenberg
St. Olaf College

Citations of this work

Respect.Robin S. Dillon - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rational Feelings and Moral Agency.Ido Geiger - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308.
Neosentimentalism and the valence of attitudes.Katie McShane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):747-765.
Moral Motivation in Kant.Konstantinos Sargentis - 2012 - Kant Studies Online (1):93-121.

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