Conversation and common ground

Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1587-1604 (2017)
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Abstract

Stalnaker’s conception of context as common ground possesses unquestionable explanatory power, shedding light on presupposition, presupposition accommodation, the behavior of certain types of conditionals, epistemic modals, and related phenomena. The CG-context approach is also highly abstract, so merely pointing out that it fails to account for an aspect of communication is an inconclusive criticism. Instead our question should be whether it can be extended or modified to account for such a phenomenon while preserving its spirit. To that end, this essay assesses the prospects of the CG-context approach for making sense of the variety of ways in which interlocutors accept propositions as well as non-propositional contents, some different types of conversation and the norms distinctive of these different types, some pre-illocutionary pragmatic phenomena, conversational injustice, and fictional discourse.

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Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

Silencing and assertion.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 749-769.
Assertion and convention.Mitchell S. Green - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.
Sneaky Assertions.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):188-218.

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References found in this work

Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 179.
Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.
On Bullshit.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1986 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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