Abstract

Atwell's book is, primarily, a commentary on chapters 1 and 2 of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals from the perspective indicated by the book's title. The problem posed is whether Kant's moral philosophy is formalistic or teleological. Atwell's argument is that it is formalistic in the sense that ends are irrelevant in determining whether actions are right or wrong. However, it is teleological in the sense that the will of a human being can "be what it truly is" only by his striving to realize its autonomy, i.e., to develop the disposition inherent in the nature of a rational agent and so "certify" his status as the final end of nature. The teleological and formalistic aspects are, Atwell maintains, intimately related in that Kant would not have put forward a formal criterion for the rightness of actions had he not held that man's final end is to transcend nature by striving for moral perfection.