Is a logic for belief sentences possible?

Philosophical Studies 47 (1):29 - 55 (1985)
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Abstract

In this paper I distinguish normative and descriptive reasons for attempting to construct a logic for belief sentences, and argue that because the interpretation of the content of an attribution of belief is context sensitive and ambiguous, no simple logic is adequate.

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Karen Green
University of Melbourne

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