Abstract

In the paper we analyse the problem of axiomatizing the minimal variant of discussive logic denoted as $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {0}}$$ D 0. Our aim is to give its axiomatization that would correspond to a known axiomatization of the original discussive logic $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {2}}$$ D 2. The considered system is minimal in a class of discussive logics. It is defined similarly, as Jaśkowski’s logic $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {2}}$$ D 2 but with the help of the deontic normal logic $$\textbf{D}$$ D. Although we focus on the smallest discussive logic and its correspondence to $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {2}}$$ D 2, we analyse to some extent also its formal aspects, in particular its behaviour with respect to rules that hold for classical logic. In the paper we propose a deductive system for the above recalled discussive logic. While formulating this system, we apply a method of Newton da Costa and Lech Dubikajtis—a modified version of Jerzy Kotas’s method used to axiomatize $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {2}}$$ D 2. Basically the difference manifests in the result—in the case of da Costa and Dubikajtis, the resulting axiomatization is pure modus ponens-style. In the case of $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {0}}$$ D 0, we have to use some rules, but they are mostly needed to express some aspects of positive logic. $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {0}}$$ D 0 understood as a set of theses is contained in $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {2}}$$ D 2. Additionally, any non-trivial discussive logic expressed by means of Jaśkowski’s model of discussion, applied to any regular modal logic of discussion, contains $${\textsf {D}}_{\textsf {0}}$$ D 0.