Based on a True Story

Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):19-34 (2011)
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Abstract

In several essays, John Fischer motivates his guidance control view of moral responsibility by discussing the value of acting freely. What we value, he argues, is unhindered self-expression that derives its meaning from a narrative structure. In this paper, I claim that while Fischer may be correct that self-expression (understood in its narrative sense) is the value of acting freely, it is less clear that the kind of self-expression that we value sits comfortably with determinism. The meaning of one’s narrative may include the accuracy of one’s self-conception, an accuracy that may be substantially undermined by the truth of determinism.

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2011-01-09

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Meghan Griffith
Davidson College

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Narrative capacity and moral responsibility.Meghan Griffith - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):93-113.

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