Abstract

At first glance style and philosophy bear an accidental or external relationship to each other. We might refer to Kant’s work, for example, as being stylistically bad, but philosophically seminal and interesting. That is, Kant’s writing could be criticized as being a poor instance of a given species of style. One would not criticize Kant’s style on the basis that it isn’t poetic enough, but rather on the basis that within the species of philosophical treatise writing, it fails to exhibit the requisite clarity, compactness, and the like, which the best instances of that species ought to exhibit. And while one might lament the fact that Kant’s writing style isn’t one of the best instances of that species, one would not count this lament as a final or telling objection against Kant’s philosophy, i.e., against the content of his works. Of course the “content” of Kant’s writing could be objected to on the basis of its arguments’ validity, or of the truth of its premises, or of its formulation of the problem to be overcome. Such objections are normally not thought to concern the style, but rather the philosophy in question. The distinction here is frequently referred to as the “form-content” distinction. Thus, to paraphrase, at first glance form and content seem to bear an external relationship to each other in philosophy.