Does virtue ethics allow us to make better judgments of the actions of others?

In Elisa Grimi, John Haldane, Maria Margarita Mauri Alvarez, Michael Wladika, Marco Damonte, Michael Slote, Randall Curren, Christian B. Miller, Liezl Zyl, Christopher D. Owens, Scott J. Roniger, Michele Mangini, Nancy Snow & Christopher Toner (eds.), Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect. Springer (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Virtue ethics has now well and truly established itself as one of the main normative theories. It is now quite common, and indeed, expected, for virtue ethics to be included, alongside deontology and consequentialism, in any Moral Philosophy syllabus worth its salt. Students are typically introduced to virtue ethics only after studying the other two normative theories, and this often sets the scene for various sorts of misunderstandings, with students expecting virtue ethics to be based on the same set of rules and assumptions as its rivals. Or at least, that is my experience. In this paper I want to focus on one such misunderstanding, which arises when trying to apply virtue ethics to our judgments of other people’s actions and behaviour. Although there are countless ways in which a theory can be misunderstood, it is worth guarding against this one in particular, given that it can lead someone who takes virtue ethics seriously to act in ways that are not virtuous, or even vicious. I begin by making a few remarks about the role of normative theory, and then go on to give four examples of how applying virtue ethics can lead to poor behaviour. In the final section I identify the mistake in question and conclude by noting how it can be avoided.

Similar books and articles

Was Kant a virtue ethicist?Robert N. Johnson - 2008 - In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. De Gruyter. pp. 61-76.
Was Kant a virtue ethicist?Robert N. Johnson - 2008 - In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. De Gruyter. pp. 61-76.
What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?Sukaina Hirji - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):671-696.
The Limits of Virtue Ethics.Travis Timmerman & Yishai Cohen - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 10:255-282.
Contemporary virtue ethics and action-guiding objections.F. Scott McElreath - 2018 - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):69-79.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-31

Downloads
667 (#38,915)

6 months
194 (#16,910)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Help! Virtue Profiles and Horses for Courses.David Lumsden & Joseph Ulatowski - 2022 - Australasian Philosophical Review 6 (2):196-203.
Communication levels of the individual.V. M. Rubskyi - 2019 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 16:24-32.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references