Abstract

The essay argues that the unitary physiognomy of Duns Scotus’ philosophy is based on the notion of “addition.” Precisely as a theologian who moves from what is believed to what is believed, ultimately Scotus ends up being more of a philosopher than Thomas Aquinas. Thomas limits himself to applying an already made philosophy to theology by correcting and integrating philosophy there where it is in contradiction with the revealed truth. On the contrary, Scotus is concerned with the formulation of a new philosophy that may somehow correspond to the truth of revelation. Thomas’ being is imported from the Greek tradition, and works regardless of whether God is trinity or not. Such a theological truth has no strictly philosophical repercussions. Scotus’ being works only if God is trinity, or better: it offers the transcendental justification for the possibility of an “object” such as the trinity. From such an “object,” through a move of universalization, the entire configuration of being is then rethought and rebalanced. Scotus’ philosophy appears as a unified attempt at solving the question of how being should be if one wants to grant the possibility of a uni-trinitarian God. Thomas does not pose such question which, in its theological impudence, is radically philosophical. The non-identitas formalis ex parte rei [the formal non-identity on the part of the thing] as a distinction media [intermediary distinction] between real distinction and the distinction of reason opens the way to a new definition of the infinite understood as that which is more than itself. The logic of formalities establishes a new type of judgment which is simultaneously analytic and synthetic. The concept of simplicitas Dei [God’s simplicity], which is a real main beam in medieval theology, is maintained and overcome: God is simple, but this simplicity enables addition, which in this essay is indicated as “simplicity”.