Abstract

This dissertation develops a contradiction that emerges between Heidegger's substantive conception of Dasein and the methodology through which he attempts to demonstrate the truth of his account of Dasein. The aim is to show how the depth of Heidegger's continued commitment to a number of fundamental assumptions of transcendental philosophy constitutes both a source of significant insight and deep philosophical confusion for his project in Being and Time . ;The first two chapters follow the way in which Heidegger's view that Dasein is an entity that is essentially "amidst" a "world" of entities results from his reflections on the failings of the accounts of truth and judgment found in logical psychologism, Neo-Kantianism, and Husserlian phenomenology. Against Husserl and the logical psychologists, Heidegger is shown to stress the importance of a strictly formal, functional approach to assertions in the context of logical investigations. Against the Neo-Kantians, Heidegger is shown to stress the importance of being able to connect a prior understanding of the general features of the world with a concrete grasp of the particular entities about which we think. Heidegger's extreme formalism together with his almost complete neglect of the concrete structures and content of language is then demonstrated to lead to a conception of discourse that is completely empty and, hence, incapable of relating universal and particular in the manner required by his account of the possibility of intentional experience. It is this fact, above all, that is shown to lead Heidegger to insist upon the essential foundedness of assertions and assertoric truth on our practical dealings with things. ;The last chapter brings out the way in which Heidegger's understanding of discourse commits him to an odd empiricist conception of philosophical justification. Heidegger's efforts to apply this conception of justification reflexively to his own account of Dasein is then shown to generate strong requirements that cannot be satisfied as long as Dasein is amidst entities through its practical dealings. Since Dasein is as such only insofar as it is amidst entities, Heidegger is finally forced to chose between his substantive account of Dasein and the possibility of demonstrating its truth