Conditionals in Theories of Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63 (2017)
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Abstract

We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.

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Author Profiles

Shawn Standefer
National Taiwan University
Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic.Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):305-405.
Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Proof Theory for Functional Modal Logic.Shawn Standefer - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (1):49-84.
Paradoxes and contemporary logic.Andrea Cantini - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logic, semantics, metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by John Corcoran & J. H. Woodger.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.

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