Abstract

Robert Sinclair: Quine on Evidence: Quine's influential “Epistemology Naturalized” is typically read as arguing for the replacement of the “normative” project of traditional epistemology with a psychological description of the causal processes involved in belief acquisition. Recent commentators have rejected this view, arguing that rather than eliminate normative concerns, Quine's proposal seeks to locate them within his scientific conception of epistemology. This chapter examines this debate concerning the normative credentials of Quine's naturalized account of knowledge and its consequences for understanding the role of justification and evidence within his epistemology. It explains how Quine's appeal to psychology should be seen as addressing normative concerns over the evidential connections between theory and observation and further indicates how he addresses issues involving evidence and justification. It concludes by considering some later changes in Quine's epistemology that may be seen as challenging his attempt to address the evidential support of science.