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In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 608–622 (1994)
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Abstract

The notion of weakness of will or ‘akrasia’(to use its Greek name) figures importantly in moral philosophy. Agents are said to be weak‐willed when they have reached conclusions about their moral duties, but then fail to act on these conclusions. Since it is often difficult to be moral – to live up to one's moral principles – there would seem to be nothing particularly surprising or troubling about this notion, and certainly nothing especially pressing for the philosophy of mind. But this appearance is wrong on both counts.

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Samuel Guttenplan
Birkbeck College

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