Varieties of zombiehood

Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):326-33 (1995)
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Abstract

On the basis of distinguishing three different kinds of zombies , I argue that Moody's argument against the conscious inessentialism thesis and physicalism is invalid, and comparatively analyse similarities as well as differences between two responses to Moody: Flanagan & Polger and Dennett

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Guven Guzeldere
Harvard University

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