The Legitimacy of Metaphysics

Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):29-43 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Part of Kant’s legacy to Peirce was a lasting conviction that metaphysics is not irredeemable, but can and should be set “on the secure path of a science”. However, Peirce’s “scientific metaphysics”, unlike Kant’s, uses the method of science, i.e., of experience and reasoning; but requires close attention to experience of the most familiar kind rather than the recherché experience needed by the special sciences. This distinctively plausible reconception of what a genuinely scientific metaphysics would be is part of Peirce’s legacy to philosophy today, enabling us to steer clear of both apriorism and of scientism - the Scylla and Charybdis of recent metaphysics.

Other Versions

reprint Haack, Susan (2008) "The Legitimacy of Metaphysics". Philosophical Topics 36(1):97-110

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,888

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
131 (#167,846)

6 months
14 (#227,991)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Susan Haack
University of Miami

Citations of this work

Pragmatism, critical realism and the study of value.Dave Elder-Vass - 2022 - Journal of Critical Realism 21 (3):261-287.
The Historicity of Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences.Chiara Ambrosio - 2016 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 8 (2).
A face estética da epistemologia pragmaticista de Peirce.Ivo A. Ibri - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 65 (3):e38456.
Peirce’s Hypothesis of the Final Opinion.Aaron B. Wilson - 2018 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 10 (2).

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references