Substance in the Eyes of Lock

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 13 (51):167-180 (2012)
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Abstract

The problem and the concept of substance are considered to be one of the basic and perennial subjects in philosophy. It takes an important place within philosophy both epistemologically and ontologically, and most philosophers have discussed it in their works. In his book, A Survey Concerning Human Understanding, John Lock, the father of empirical philosophy in England, has discussed the concept of substance and how it is conceptualized in the mind, and through that, he has come to believe in their independent existence. According to him, the concept of substance is originated from a supposition and a rational inference: that the qualities cannot be self-existent. He believes that we have no notion of substance in mind, save a substratum upon which the accidents stand. So the concept of substance is not known through experience at all whether the experience is a sensation or a reflection. Therefore in believing in the concept of substance, Lock has ignored his empirical principles, as he has ignored his empirical method in believing in its objectivity, because he does not believe in any kind of a priori concepts or judgments. In this paper, however, we will offer an empirical understanding of the concept of substance; a point that was not intuited by Lock. In this view, the concept of substance is considered empirical, but believing in its independent existence based on an a priori rational principle is regarded as violating the empirical principle that no a priori principle exists. Thus, on the basis of Lock’s empiricism we can believe in the concept of substance but not in its external existence.

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