Freedom Fit for a Feminist? On the Feminist Potential of Quentin Skinner's Conception of Republican Freedom

Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory 17 (1):86-103 (2014)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to make it credible that there are feminist reasons for being a republican about freedom. In focus is Quentin Skinner’s conception of republican, or “neo-Roman”, freedom. Republican theory in history has not excelled in making poverty, gender hierarchy, and racism within the republic into main sources of concern. So can there be a radical republican theory of liberty fit for a feminist, to make sense of arbitrary power in the every day life of work, households, and local communities, where power is vague and unorganized? Proceeding from three questions – What does freedom mean? Under what circumstances does the issue arise? Why should we care? – I argue that in a feminist republicanism the lived experience of the unfree will have primary and not, as Skinner now suggests, secondary importance. A feminist republican will be particularly concerned not only with what unfreedom is but with what it is like.

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Lena Halldenius
Lund University

Citations of this work

Freedom in Political Philosophy.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2022 - Oxford Research Encyclopedias.
XII—Fighting for My Mind: Feminist Logic at the Edge of Enlightenment.Hannah Dawson - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):275-306.

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