Speculative Truth

Philosophy 32 (123):289-301 (1957)
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Abstract

IN delivering this lecture I am to speak on some aspect of truth. The practice of examining the various contexts in which a word may be used, in order to disclose what its usages have in common as a clue to its meaning, is of respectable antiquity. If I indulge this practice I find an “embarras de richesse” in modern philosophical literature under two headings, the truth of analytic propositions and the truth of synthetic propositions: the first deals with criteria of consistency and the second with criteria of verifiability.

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Citations of this work

Scientific Beliefs about Oneself.Donald MacKay - 1970 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 4:48-63.
Scientific Beliefs about Oneself.Donald MacKay - 1970 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 4:48-63.

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