The Concept of “Essential” General Validity in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

In Sorin Costreie, Early Analytic Philosophy – New Perspectives on the Tradition. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag (2016)
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Abstract

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein describes the general validity of logical truths as being “essential,” as opposed to merely “accidental” general truths. He does not say much more, and little has been said about it by commentators. How to make sense of the essential general validity by which Wittgenstein characterizes logic? This chapter aims to clarify this crucial concept.

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La logique, science recherchée.Brice Halimi - 2020 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 106 (2):145-164.

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