Abstract

In the Hume period and beyond, through some of his views The Idea has been formed in the minds of some scholars that "the explanation of the way in which ideas or concepts originate is a way or the only way to secure their reality and epistemological validity" That is to say "if we cannot explain how a concept or idea originates, it will lack epistemological validity". By adopting this Idea, the fate of very important issues such as the possibility of Science and Metaphysics is tied to the discussion of the "origin of ideas" and thus this debate has found an extraordinary importance. The trace of this Idea is also, more or less, visible in the Contemporary Islamic philosophy. In this article I challenged this Idea and tried, with establishing some arguments, to show that; the epistemological validity of a concept lies, above all, in the very concept itself and is revealed in its comparison with reality and thus, explaining how concepts originate is not, firstly the only way and secondly the best and the shortest way to attain their epistemological validity, and yet has considerable difficulties within itself. If this claim is true, then it will have very important consequences, Including: 1) Tying the fate of Science and Metaphysics to the discussion of the origin of ideas is wrong and is an epistemological-historical mistake. And so 2) the discussion of the origin of the ideas has no epistemological utility and necessity as some had attributed to it.