A.J. Ayer: Analysing what We Mean

Weidenfeld & Nicolson (1997)
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Abstract

According to Ayer, philosophy is an activity of analysis, not a means to truth. First principles and metaphysical truths can neither be established or denied byphilosophical enquiry. He tried to prove that verifibility (whether a proposition can be shown to be true or false) was the key principle of philosophical methodology.

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