On an Alleged Truth/Falsity Asymmetry in Context Shifting Experiments

Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):530-545 (2012)
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Abstract

Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique DeRose's reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose's bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose's arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is good reason to pay close attention to several subtle aspects of the design of context shifting experiments

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Nat Hansen
University of Reading

References found in this work

Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys.Keith DeRose - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):81-110.
What is said.François Recanati - 2001 - Synthese 128 (1-2):75--91.

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