Tennant on knowability

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422 – 428 (1999)
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Abstract

The knowability paradox threatens metaphysical or semantical antirealism, the view that truth is epistemic, by revealing an awful consequence of the claim [i] that all truths are knowable. Various attempts have been made to find a way out of the paradox.

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Author Profiles

Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis
Michael Hand
Texas A&M University

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