Abstract
OPINION IS DIVIDED as to whether the "qualitative characters" or "qualia" of conscious sensory experiences such as color perceptions and pain sensations genuinely constitute a major obstacle to the success or tenability of contemporary physicalist theories of mind. Do the enormous complexities of human brain activity--conceived more or less as we now conceive it--alone suffice to account for our conscious sensory experiences, and thereby show how the experiences are nothing over and above the brain activities, or must there be some further kind of thing, if we are to account for the existence of our kind of consciousness? This issue, representing perhaps the most profound division of opinion in contemporary philosophy of mind, cannot possibly reach a genuine resolution in the absence of a satisfactory answer to a question which has suffered astonishing neglect in the extensive debate on this issue: What exactly is the qualitative character of a conscious sensory experience? What exactly is it about color perception, for example, that makes it so distinctive in a "qualitative" respect, allegedly making trouble for contemporary theories of mind?
