Does Value-Neutrality Maximize Objectivity in Social Science?

der 16. Weltkongress Für Philosophie 2:618-625 (1983)
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Abstract

Four well-known claims about the nature of scientific knowledge can be conjoined to challenge the traditional value-neutrality thesis. These are the Duhem-Quine thesis, the Kuhnian thesis, the "publicity of science" claim, and the "reflexivity of social inquiry" claim. Maximal objectivity reqnires not value-neutrality, but a commitment by the researcher to certain social values—namely those which tend to equalize political advantage in a community. This is an epistemological, not an ethical, argument.

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