Hooray! We're Not Morally Responsible!

Think 8 (23):87-95 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Being morally responsible means being blameworthy and deserving of punishment if we do wrong and praiseworthy and deserving reward if we do right. In what follows I shall argue that in all likelihood we're not morally responsible. None of us. Ever.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1017/s147717560999008x

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,341

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Extending compatibilism: Control, responsibility, and blame.Oisín Deery - 2007 - Res Publica 13 (3):209-230.
On the Relative Unimportance of Moral Responsibility.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1998 - Ethical Perspectives 5 (3):188-199.
On the Relative Unimportance of Moral Responsibility.Isthiyaque Haji - 1998 - Ethical Perspectives 5 (3):188-199.
Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - 2021 - 2021: Polity. Edited by Gregg D. Caruso.
Against Legal Punishment.Nathan Hanna - 2022 - In Matthew C. Altman, The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 559-78.
Being Morally Responsible for an Action Versus Acting Responsibly or Irresponsibly.Susan Leigh Anderson - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:451-462.
Being Morally Responsible for an Action Versus Acting Responsibly or Irresponsibly.Susan Leigh Anderson - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:451-462.
Two faces of desert.Matt King - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):401-424.
Moral responsibility, conversation, and desert: comments on Michael McKenna’s conversation and responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):63-72.
The objects of moral responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1357-1381.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-10-15

Downloads
301 (#96,953)

6 months
17 (#176,677)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.

Add more references