Inference

In Richard Mervyn Hare (ed.), The Language of Morals. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (1952)
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Abstract

Hare argues that one exception to the rule that no imperative conclusion can validly be drawn from premises that do not contain at least one imperative are ‘hypothetical imperatives’ because their content, though of an imperative, is that of a statement implicit in the premises. He then argues that no ethical theory can be a ‘Cartesian’ moral system, i.e. consist of particular duties derived from self‐evident principles alone. Finally, three arguments are given why description can never be prescription, and thus that no imperative can be inferred from indicative alone.

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