Moral particularism and transduction

Philosophical Issues 15 (1):44–55 (2005)
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Abstract

Can someone be reasonable or justified in accepting a specific moral judgment not based on the prior acceptance of a general exceptioness moral principle, where acceptance of a general principle might be tacit or implicit and might not be expressible in language? This issue is an instance of a wider issue about direct or transductive inference. Developments in statistical learning theory show that such an inference can be more effective than alternative methods using inductive generalization and so can be reasonable. This result carries over to moral transduction, although it is a difficult empirical issue whether people actually engage in any sort of transduction, including moral transduction.

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Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Reasons and Moral Principles.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 839-61.
Moral Perception.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
Moral Particularism.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Modelling ethical rules of lying with answer set programming.Jean-Gabriel Ganascia - 2007 - Ethics and Information Technology 9 (1):39-47.
Moral particularism in the light of deontic logic.Xavier Parent - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 19 (2-3):75-98.

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The sources of normativity.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Moral reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Cambridge: Blackwell.

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