Smoke Machines

American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1):69-86 (2025)
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Abstract

Emotive artificial intelligences are physically or virtually embodied entities whose behavior is driven by artificial intelligence, and which use expressions usually associated with emotion to enhance communication. These entities are sometimes thought to be deceptive, insofar as their emotive expressions are not connected to genuine underlying emotions. In this paper, I argue that such entities are indeed deceptive, at least given a sufficiently broad construal of deception. But, while philosophers and other commentators have drawn attention to the deceptive threat of emotive artificial intelligences, I argue that such entities also pose an overlooked skeptical threat. In short, the widespread existence of emotive signals disconnected from underlying emotions threatens to encourage skepticism of such signals more generally, including emotive signals used by human persons. Thus, while designing artificially intelligent entities to use emotive signals is thought to facilitate human-AI interaction, this practice runs the risk of compromising human-human interaction.

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Keith Raymond Harris
University of Vienna

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References found in this work

Fake News and Partisan Epistemology.Regina Rini - 2017 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (S2):43-64.
Deepfakes and the Epistemic Backstop.Regina Rini - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (24):1-16.
Fake News: A Definition.Axel Gelfert - 2018 - Informal Logic 38 (1):84-117.
Getting told and being believed.Richard Moran - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.

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