Abstract

In clinical research, decision-making capacity is often equated with unspecified conceptions of autonomy, and autonomy is often equated with personhood. On this view, the loss of decision-making capacity is seen as a loss of autonomy, and the loss of autonomy subsumes a loss of personhood. An ethical concern arises at the intersection of those philosophical considerations with the legal considerations in informed consent. Because persons with inadequate decision-making capacity cannot provide legally effective consent, enrollment in research can occur only if a surrogate gives permission on the person’s behalf. Federal regulations and resulting institutional policies allow permission from surrogates empowered under state law to consent to medical treatment procedures, typically in a hierarchy of legislatively prioritized relationships lacking regard for what the surrogate actually knows about the current research-related values and preferences of the potential subject. As a result, the research enterprise often countenances reliance on surrogates who have no relational or informational basis for an enrollment decision that aligns with the values and preferences of the subject. Arguing from the perspective that losing decision-making capacity does not alter the moral status of persons, and that respect for persons rather than respect for autonomy is the central ethical obligation, I assess the ethical implications of allowing persons with no knowledge of the values and preferences of the potential subject to make enrollment decisions, concluding that reliance on uninformed surrogates is not an ethically defensible approach to enrolling subjects in clinical research.