Abstract

The thesis of this dissertation is that in the Crisis Edmund Husserl held to an instrumentalist interpretation of scientific laws only. His position is therefore compatible with the realist construal of scientific theories. The study is divided into three parts. In part one, one chapter is devoted to an explication of Husserl's idea of science, deductive and empirical; the second chapter traces the development of Husserl's phenomenological approach to the foundations of the sciences--from the pure logic of the Logical Investigations, to the regional ontologies of the Ideas, to the intentional history of the Crisis. The second part anticipates, and refutes, two possible objections to the thesis--one on the basis of Husserl's "evidence theory of truth," the other from Husserl's "evidence theory of rationality." In the third part the author argues from the main thesis, and refutes two other possible objections--one from Husserl's perceivability condition on real existence, the other from Husserl's ostensible idealism. The study concludes with a critical response to other Husserl interpreters, a restatement of the main thesis, and the suggestion that a phenomenology of theoretical entities could be carried out as an intentional analysis of indicative sign-consciousness in theoretical contexts