Abstract

This dissertation examines Nietzsche's moral philosophy in order to understand what his "immoralism" consists in and what values underlie this criticism. I argue that Nietzsche does not merely repudiate accepted moral values in favour of their opposites, but out of a concern for acknowledged goods like individual sovereignty, reason, virtue, and human excellence. His attack on morality is revealed as a critique of non-naturalistic conceptions of morality, characterized by a reliance on intrinsic values and categorical imperatives. Nietzsche condemns this conception as opposed to reason-giving and calls for a return to naturalistic evaluation, even though this would in a sense mean an end to Morality itself. Following this, I explore Nietzsche's views on happiness and the aim of morality. Denying that there is any inherent moral end, Nietzsche opposes the common conception of happiness as pleasure, satisfied desire or the absence of suffering, offering in its place the goal of power. This end is not to be understood as political domination, however, but reflects Nietzsche's concern for individual excellence and culture. The fundamental opposition between these ideas of happiness is examined, in order to indicate why this interest in power inevitably brings Nietzsche into conflict with the values of Christian morality. Following this, the problem of nihilism is examined, noting how Nietzsche sees the need for new cultural goals to give our lives meaning and how these also contribute to the enhancement of power. Finally, I discuss how Nietzsche's recognition of the value of culture and tradition leads him to an uncommon but positive appreciation of morality itself