Some more thoughts on semantic oughts: A reply to Daniel Whiting

Analysis 69 (1):54-63 (2009)
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Abstract

1. IntroductionA considerable number of philosophers maintain that meaning is intrinsically normative. In this journal, Daniel Whiting has defended the normativity of meaning against some of my recent objections . 1 This paper responds to Whiting's arguments

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2009-02-23

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Anandi Hattiangadi
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?Daniel Whiting - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):535-555.
Anti-Normativism Evaluated.Ulf Hlobil - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):376-395.
The Austerity Framework and semantic normativity.Mark Pinder - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (1-2):123-141.

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References found in this work

Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
Is meaning normative?Anandi Hattiangadi - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.

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