Markets and Medical Decisions

Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 36 (1-2):146-161 (2024)
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Abstract

This essay argues for two conclusions. First, clinical decision-making is not best thought of as analogous to the purchase of other services, such as car repair. Health-care decision-making is far more difficult, collaborative, emotionally fraught, and subject to cognitive distortions. Second, the provision of health care should not be delegated to unregulated markets. Unlike other markets, there is no reason to expect health-care market outcomes to be efficient or fair or to promote individual freedom, properly conceived. Markets may play an important role in implementing an allocation of healthcare, but they are not an ethically acceptable alternative to determining what that allocation should be.

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2024-05-14

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Daniel Hausman
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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References found in this work

Negative and positive freedom.Gerald MacCallum - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (3):312-334.
Medical progress and national health care.Loren E. Lomasky - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1):65-88.

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